1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek
UDK 355.40(497.4)"1943/1945"

Boris Mlakar: Obveščevalna služba Slovenskega domobranstva. Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, Maribor 83=48(2012), 2–3, str. 69–82

Obveščevalna služba je nujen predpogoj za normalno delovanje vsake oborožene formacije, kar še posebej velja za medvojno delovanje. To je veljalo tudi za Slovensko domobranstvo med letoma 1943–1945, pri čemer to ni bila tipična vojaška formacija, saj npr. v svojem štabu ni imela operativnega odseka, saj so o večjih operacijah proti partizanskim enotam odločale nemške vojaške oblasti. Je pa omenjeni štab imel svoj obveščevalni odsek, ki ga je vodil major Albert Ilovar. Odsek je organiziral in nadzoroval delovanje obveščevalne službe na terenu, pri čemer je vsaka večja domobranska enota imela svojega obveščevalca, ki pa je imel še svoje zaupnike. Poleg tega je bilo po pokrajinah organiziranih še 10 obveščevalnih centrov, ki so na štab pošiljali poročila o delovanju partizanskih enot, o organizaciji Osvobodilne fronte, sezname nasprotnikov ter zaslišanja ujetnikov. Zaslišanja je opravljal še obveščevalni odsek, ki je tudi odločal o usodi zapornikov. Načeloma pa so vse ujetnike ter zbirna poročila domobranski organi morali oddajati nadrejenim nemškim poveljstvom. Zaradi ilegalnega delovanja ter stikov s četniki so poleti 1944 nemške oblasti zelo omejile domobransko obveščevalno službo, nekatere njene akterje pa zaprle.

1.01 Original Scientific Article
UDC 355.40(497.4)"1943/1945"

Boris Mlakar: The Slovene Home Guard Intelligence Service. Review for History and Ethnography, Maribor 83=48(2012), 2–3, pp. 69–82

An intelligence service is an essential precondition for a normal functioning of each armed formation and this is even of a greater importance in the state of war. This was also the case for the Slovene Home Guard in the period between 1943 and 1945, although the Home Guard was not a typical army formation, for it did not have an operative section in its staff. The reason for this was that the German military authorities were the ones to decide on the bigger actions against the Partisan units. The above mentioned staff did have its own intelligence section, which was led by Major Albert Ilovar. This section organised and supervised the organisation of the intelligence for the field work, and each bigger Home Guard unit had its own informant who also had his own confidants. Besides all of this the regions also had 10 intelligence centres that sent reports on the actions of the Partisan units, reports on the organisation of the Liberation Front, lists of opponents and reports on prisoners’ interrogations to the staff. The interrogations were also carried out by the intelligence section, which also decided on prisoners’ faith. In principle the Home Guard authorities were obliged to pass on all the prisoners and reports to the German superior command. In summer 1944 the German authorities limited the Home Guard Intelligence Service because of its illegal actions and connections with the Chetniks and some of its members were imprisoned.